Abstract-Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The problem has been well-studied in the case of limited supply (one copy of each item), and in the case of digital goods (the seller can produce additional copies at no cost). Yet in the case of resourcesoil, labor, computing cycles, etc.-neither of these abstractions is just right: additional supplies of these resources can be found, but at increasing difficulty (marginal cost) as resources are depleted.
INTRODUCTION
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). This problem is typically studied in one of two extreme cases -the case of limited supply (one copy of each item) or the case of unlimited supply (the seller can produce additional copies at no cost). For the case of limited supply, there are strong negative results (see [7] and the references therein) unless one makes additional assumptions on the buyers' valuations (e.g., submodularity [12] , [15] , [11] , [10] ). In contrast, for unlimited supply, which is characteristic of digital goods, maximizing social welfare is trivial by giving all the items away for free, and for revenue maximization, good bounds can be achieved for general buyers [8] , [5] . However, in the case of resources-whether oil or computing cycles or food or attention span-the unlimited-supply case is too optimistic and the limited-supply case too pessimistic.
More often than not, additional sources can be found, but at higher cost. Indeed, the classical market equilibrium in economic theory assumes that as prices rise, supply increases while demand decreases (giving a unique price which clears the market). Such a supply curve corresponds to a cost of obtaining goods that increases with the number of items desired.
In this work, we initiate the study of this setting where additional resources can be found, but at increasing marginal cost, for the algorithmic mechanism design problem of combinatorial pricing. 1 That is, a seller has n goods, and for each good i there is a non-decreasing marginal cost function c i (), capturing the fact that additional units of this good can be obtained, but at an increasing difficulty to the seller per unit. We specifically focus on the most challenging setting of posted item prices 2 in the face of an unknown series of buyers, with unknown and arbitrary combinatorial valuation functions, who arrive online. That is, the seller (e.g., a supermarket) must assign prices to each of n goods, then a buyer arrives with some arbitrary combinatorial valuation function and purchases the bundle maximizing her own quasilinear utility (valuation minus price). After the buyer has made her purchase, the seller may adjust prices, then the next buyer arrives, and so on. In this setting, the seller cannot ask a buyer to submit her utility function, cannot run VCG, and cannot charge an admission fee to enter the store. We consider two natural goals -maximizing social welfare (the sum of buyers' valuations on bundles purchased, minus the costs incurred by the seller for obtaining these items) 3 and maximizing profit (the total amount paid by the buyers, minus the costs incurred by the seller). Our main result is that using appropriate algorithms we can in fact perform nearly as well as in the much easier setting of digital goods for a wide range of cost curves.
A second scenario where our results are applicable is in the context of network routing with congestion. Specifically, we would like to maximize the sum of valuations of routed connections (each user has some pair of terminals and a 1 One could also study decreasing marginal costs, though we point out that modeling decreasing marginal costs in a non-Bayesian adversarial setting poses difficulties. For example, there are situations where any algorithm can make positive profit only by initially going into deficit, at which point the adversary could send in no more buyers. 2 By virtue of posted pricing, our mechanisms are inherently incentive compatible. 3 Social welfare is a natural objective if we view the seller as a resource allocator within a company, and buyers as various units in the company needing resources. valuation on receiving a connection) minus the congestion cost of routing them. The congestion cost can reflect either the energy required to support the traffic on the network or the cost of additional infrastructure needed to maintain the quality of service under increased load. [1] indicate that energy curves for processors exhibit dis-economies of scale i.e. energy expenditure is super-linear as a function of processor speed. Such a scenario is captured by our model of increasing marginal cost, which for network routing would mean increasing marginal congestion costs.
We will sometimes refer to marginal cost to the seller of the k th copy of an item as the production cost of that item.
Our Results and Techniques
We focus on two goals: maximizing social welfare, and maximizing profit. Social welfare is the total valuation of the buyers for their bundles purchased, minus the cost to the seller of all items sold. That is, it is the total utility of all players including the seller. Note that because the production costs are not flat, even to maximize social welfare, one cannot simply sell items at their production costs; one must sell at a price higher than the production cost 4 . This is in order to ensure that items reach the buyers who want them (approximately) most. The second goal is to maximize profit, i.e., the sum of prices charged for items sold minus their costs to the seller.
For a wide range of reasonable cost functions (linear, low-degree polynomial, logarithmic), we present a pricing algorithm that achieves a social welfare within a constant factor of the optimal social welfare allocation minus a necessary additive loss. This holds for buyers with arbitrary combinatorial valuation functions. Furthermore, the algorithm is quite 'natural' and reasonable: we price the k th copy of any good at the production cost of the 2k th copy 5 . This algorithm, that we call twice-the-index, appears in Section 3.
We then consider general increasing cost functions, on which twice-the-index may not give good guarantees. For these, we present the smoothing algorithm in Section 4 that gives a logarithmic approximation (again with a necessary additive loss) for maximizing social welfare, generalizing results of [6] that hold in the limited-supply case. The main technique here is to find a "smooth" price curve that does not make sharp jumps, but that tries to stay within a constant factor of the cost function. For the case of convex cost functions, the result yields a logarithmic approximation to the social welfare, as long as the production cost for the first logarithmically many copies of all the items is small compared to the optimum welfare. (This result is essentially the best possible, with both logarithmic losses unavoidable.) Our deterministic online algorithms for welfaremaximization can be converted into randomized algorithms for profit maximization, at a potential further loss of a logarithmic factor in the approximation. This conversion is an extension of a result of [4] for the case of single-minded buyers; the details of this conversion are given in the full version.
Related work
There is a huge body of literature on combinatorial auctions and pricing algorithms: we refer the reader to [7] , [13] and the references therein-in particular, note [6] , [15] , [12] , [11] , [9] , [14] . The setting of combinatorial auctions has been considered both in Bayesian (stochastic),; there is a large body of work in the Bayesian (stochastic) setting, where the buyers' valuations are assumed to come from a known prior distribution, and non-Bayesian (adversarial) settings. Our work focuses on the non-Bayesian or adversarial setting.
The algorithms of [9] give truthful mechanisms that achieve constant approximations to social welfare for Ω(log n) copies of each item (see also [2] ) in the offline setting. For the online setting, [6] give posted-price welfaremaximizing algorithms for combinatorial auctions in the limited supply setting-the approximation guarantees they give are logarithmic (when there are Ω(log n) copies of each item) or worse (when there are fewer copies); their results are (nearly) tight for the online limited-supply setting. The smoothing algorithm presented in Section 4 generalizes the results of [6] to more general increasing costs and not just 0-∞ costs (i.e. the limited supply case).
The work of [4] shows how to convert deterministic (or some special kind of randomized) online mechanisms for allocation problems into (randomized) posted-pricing schemes that achieve (ρ + log V max )-fraction of the optimal profit possible, where the online algorithm is ρ-competitive for the allocation problem and V max is the maximum valuation of any agent over the set of items. We extend their analysis to convert our social welfare maximizing algorithms to profit maximizing algorithms. The details of this conversion are given in the full version.
MODEL, NOTATION, AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the following setting. A seller is selling a set I = {1, . . . , n} of n items to a sequence B of m buyers who arrive one at a time. The seller can obtain (or produce) additional copies of each item but at increasing (or at least non-decreasing) production cost; specifically, let c i (k) denote the production cost to the seller for the kth copy of item i. For each item i, let C i (k) be the cumulative cost for the first k copies-i.e., I → R over possible bundles of items, and purchases the utility-maximizing bundle for herself at the current prices. That is, buyer b purchases the set S maximizing v b (S) − i∈S π i . After a buyer finishes purchasing her desired set, the seller may then readjust prices, and then the next buyer arrives, and so on.
For any particular sequence of buyers, let opt be the allocation that maximizes the social welfare. Clearly, the social welfare achieved under opt, denoted by W (opt), is an upper bound on both the maximum social welfare and maximum profit achievable by any online algorithm.
For any algorithm alg, W (alg) shall denote the social welfare attained through the algorithm. The algorithm shall determined a pricing scheme for the seller and π i (k) shall denote the sales price charged for the k th copy of item i ∈ I. While this could in principle depend on other items sold, for all our algorithms it will depend only on k and the cost-curve for the item. x i shall denote the total number of copies of item i sold by the algorithm, and P f i shall denote the price of the first unsold copy of item i-i.e., P
We shall denote the total production cost suffered by the algorithm by C(alg) and and the revenue made by P (alg). profit i shall denote the profit made by the algorithm from the sales of item i. The total profit made by the algorithm is i∈I profit i = P (alg) − C(alg).
Since x i are the total number of copies sold by the algorithm alg for item i, therefore,
The total valuation of buyers on their allocated bundles under alg is denoted by V (alg) = b∈B v b (alg(b)) where alg(b) denotes the set of items bought by buyer b from the algorithm alg. The social welfare made by the algorithm
For opt, the welfare-maximizing allocation, λ i denotes the number of copies of item i allocated in opt. C(opt), V (opt) and W (opt) are defined analogously.
A Structural Lemma
A basic challenge for maximizing social welfare in the presence of increasing production costs is that if one charges too little, then items may be purchased by an initial sequence of buyers whose valuations are too low to generate much social welfare, until the production cost has jumped to a point where only very costly items remain that are out of reach of the subsequent high valuation buyers. On the other hand, if one charges too much, then one loses the opportunity to make certain sales. This problem is compounded by the fact that buyers may have very different combinatorial preferences-one does not want to "run out" of cheap copies of one item for buyers who may have high valuation on large sets containing that item. In the following sections, we describe two pricing algorithms for addressing these issues cost curve c i () price curve π i () Figure 1 . Structural Lemma: if the lightly shaded area is bounded by a small multiple of the doubly shaded area, then we get good social welfare. x i is the last sold copy of the item and x i + 1 is the first unsold copy. The lower continuous curve is the cost curve while the upper dashed curve is the price curve.
and achieving good social welfare guarantees. In order to analyze the pricing algorithms, we first prove a key structural lemma regarding pricing under increasing production costs; this lemma will be used for all our subsequent analyses. 
then on every instance of buyers 
The term
The theorem says that if for every possible set of final prices, we can bound such a social welfare summed over items by the profit generated by the algorithm, then for every sequence of buyers the algorithm gets a good social welfare compared to the optimum.
Graphically, as shown in Figure 1 ,
is the area between the production curve c i () and the dotted line parallel to x-axis, marked by P Since each buyer buys the set that maximizes her utility, hence in particular it implies that the set alg(b) which buyer b bought from alg must be giving her at least as much utility as the set opt allocated to her i.e.
Summing over all buyers, we get
Adding and subtracting C(alg) and C(opt) on the left hand and right hand sides respectively, we get
(2) Since prices are non-decreasing, hence the price faced by any buyer cannot be more than the final price of the various items. Therefore for each buyer b,
where recall that λ i denotes the number of copies of item i allocated under opt.
The quantity (
. Therefore using Equation (2) we get
Finally using the social welfare generated by the algorithm is at least the profit made, i.e. W (alg) ≥ i∈I profit i , we get the desired result
In Section A.1 we present a variant of the structural lemma that will be useful for the analysis of the smoothing algorithm presented in Section 4.2. In the following section, we give pricing strategies that satisfy Lemma 2.1 (or its variant) for suitable α, β.
ALGORITHM: PRICING AT TWICE THE INDEX
The first two ideas for pricing items with production costs are perhaps to (a) sell at cost, or (b) sell at some constant times the cost; however, these schemes fail even for simple cost functions like linear and logarithmic production costs, respectively (Appendix A.1). In this section, we consider the next natural pricing scheme: The price π i (k) of the k th copy of an item is the production cost of the (2k) th copy. I.e.,
There is nothing special about pricing at twice the index, other factors would work as well, just giving slightly different bounds. We shall analyze this algorithm for function classes including polynomial c i (x) = x d and logarithmic c i (x) = ln(1 + x). Since these functions are strictly increasing and hence invertible, hence we shall have c
To analyze this algorithm, we shall use the result of Lemma 2.1.
Since the price π i (k) of the k th copy is c i (2 k), hence the profit made from the sales of such of a copy is 
Performance on some cost functions
We now show that for some "well-behaved" classes of functions, we get A i (x) ≤ α · profit i (x) + β i ; the β i term will usually depend on the production cost of the first few copies of the items-hence we will guarantee that we get a multiplicative α-fraction of the welfare if we ignore the production cost of the first few copies.
• Linear production costs:
, and profit i (x) = 1 2 a i x(x + 1), and hence
This result, with suitably modified guarantees, can easily be extended to the case where the actual production cost lies between two linear curves whose slopes are within a constant factor of each other.
• Polynomial production costs:
• Logarithmic production costs:
In the full version of the paper, we show that in the guarantees given above, gains in the multiplicative factor can be made while trading-off commensurate losses in the additive loss terms. Further, in Appendix A.4, we show that without any other information (like an estimate on the optimum welfare), no deterministic algorithm can give a purely multiplicative loss. Finally, in Appendix A.3, we show that twice-the-index fails for some increasing cost functions-e.g., when the production cost is zero for B items and ∞ thereafter. Hence, in the next section, we give an algorithm for increasing production costs.
GENERAL INCREASING COST FUNCTIONS
In this section, we present an algorithm that applies to general increasing cost functions, giving a logarithmic approximation minus an additive term that depends on the cost function (Theorem 4.4) 6 . For the case of convex cost functions, the analysis allows us to give a more explicit form for the additive loss (Corollary 4.6). In fact for the case of convex production costs, we get a multiplicative logarithmic approximation to W (opt) as long as the production cost of the first few logarithmic copies of all the items is small compared to W (opt). For the limited-supply setting, if we have Ω(log nm) copies of each item, the additive loss is zero and the algorithm gets a logarithmic fraction of the optimal social welfare like in [6] .
Intuition
Ideally, we would like to set prices which are sufficiently far above the cost curve (so that we generate a large social welfare), yet not be too far above it (else the high prices may result in no sales, causing a large additive loss). Hence, we run into problems when the cost curve increases sharplyand the intuitive goal is to create a price curve which smooths out these sharp changes in the cost curve while staying "close" to it.
The smoothing algorithm takes the cost curve, and creates a price function which is a monotone step function: copies of the item are grouped into intervals, with all copies in an interval having the same price. We call these intervals "price intervals". The algorithm creates the price curve from right to left. If we think of i as the effective number of copies of item i and Z as the highest price, then the th i copy is priced first at price Z through creation of the price interval [ 2 3 i , ∞) 7 , with items in this interval priced at Z; subsequently, price intervals are created progressively moving leftwards until we have priced the first copy. At each point, we use the intuition from above: if the price is much higher than the cost, we set the price for the new interval such that the price-cost gap is slashed by a factor of 2, else we set the price to maintain a sufficient gap from the cost.
The smoothing algorithm
Before we give the algorithm (in Figure 2) , let us give some definitions; we urge the impatient reader to jump to Section 4.3 to get a quick rough feel of the algorithm. We assume that the cost of the first copy of every item is 0 i.e. ∀i, c i (1) = 0 8 . Define U max , the maximum welfare any single buyer can achieve:
which equals max b∈B max T ⊆I v b (T ) because c i (1) = 0. Note that the optimal social welfare, W (opt), lies between U max and m · U max . The smoothing algorithm requires a parameter Z which satisfies Z ∈ (U max , U max / ]. ; this function will determine the number of copies we group together in a price interval. We assume that
see the full version for why this is without loss of generality. 7 We abuse notation slightly by denoting the integer interval {r, r + 1, . . . , s − 1} as the half-open real interval [r, s). 8 In the paper's full version we show that this is without loss of generality. 9 We can remove this assumption at a further loss of O(log W (opt) (log log W (opt)) 2 ) in the approximation guarantee [5] . 
for all y ∈ [x , x) , set π i (y) := c i (x) + Δ 8:
else 10: Let π i : Z + → R + be the price function and let J i denote the set of price intervals for item i, and with z i = |J i |. We refer to the q th interval of item i as J iq , with J i1 being the price interval that contains the first copy of item i, and
. Let π i (J iq ) be the price of the copies in the interval J iq . Depending on the production curve, two consecutive price intervals may have the same price. Also, we will formally state later that the prices we generate are non-decreasing, and always stay above the production cost for all copies less than i .
The main ideas

Smoothing:
Step 6 ensures a smooth price curve: if the price is more than thrice the production cost, we slash the gap between the price and production cost by two else we allow the price to stay at a sufficient gap from the cost.
Price Interval Size : The idea of the analysis is to show that whenever the number of copies sold moves from a lower price interval to a higher one, the social welfare generated by selling copies at the lower price is enough to be competitive against opt, even if we sell no further copies at the higher price. Consequently, the size of a price interval J iq must depend on the price of items in the next interval J i q+1 . It turns out that to get a multiplicative approximation factor of O(B i ), if the price of copies in J i q+1 were P , it suffices to set the width of J i q to be
Here is a simple special case that illustrates why: suppose only item i was being sold and we sold all copies from J iq but no copies from interval J i q+1 . We would like to apply Lemma 4.4. The final price P f i in that case is P = π i (J i q+1 ). Staring at the left hand side of Equation (1), we see that it is at most P ·c invt i (P ). Since we sold all the copies in price interval J iq , we sold at least
Bi many copies, each at profit at least P/6 (something we will prove later). Hence on the right hand side of Equation (1), the term profit i is at least P ·
we satisfy Equation (1) and thereby get an O(B i ) approximation. Since the width of J iq depends on the price of J i q+1 , it is natural that our pricing algorithm creates price intervals from right to left. Termination: The algorithm terminates in one of two ways: either while creating such appropriately sized price intervals, we hit the first copy (i.e., x ← 1 in Step 5, and then the loop condition fails in Step 3) or the price p of some price interval is low enough that p < c i (B i ), which implies c invt i (p) < B i (the proof of implication appears later) and therefore
Step 11. In the latter case, the price has become low enough that we can simply group all remaining copies into the lowest priced interval J i1 at price p. The subsequent analysis will often have to separately consider these two cases: whether x ← 1 is achieved in Step 5 or in Step 11. 
The Analysis
Let us call an interval J iq = [r, s) to be full-sized if its width equals width i (π i (s)). Note that the right-most interval J izi is not full sized since it semi-infinite. Further, the leftmost interval J i1 may not be full-sized either because the algorithm ran out of copies, or the price became too low so that all remaining unpriced copies were bunched together. We first show that if we sell at least |J i1 | + |J i2 | copies of item i, i.e., we have sold at least one full-sized interval, we get a good approximation factor for the reasons we discussed in Section 4.3. This is proved in Lemma 4.2.
Then we consider the case when the number of items sold is less than |J i1 | + |J i2 |: in this case we cannot show a good multiplicative loss. Instead, we show that the price of items in the first two intervals is small in this case, which bounds the additive loss. This is proved in Lemma 4.5. Finally, our main result Theorem 4.4 follows from these two lemmas.
All the intervals except the leftmost J i1 and rightmost J izi ones are created in a similar fashion; intervals J i1 and J izi have to treated as special cases at several points in the analysis. Also, the analysis which follows from this point onwards up till (and not including) Theorem 4.4 is per item. Hence the subscript i in the terms involved is irrelevant from the point of analysis and is present only to maintain uniformity in presentation.
To begin, we state some useful properties of the prices and widths of the intervals (proof is in the full version).
Lemma 4.1 (Prices and Widths). The following facts about interval prices hold for the intervals in
. If the cost curve is convex the claim also holds for q
Lemma 4.1(a) states that the price of any copy is sufficiently far from the production cost of that copy. Lemma 4.1(a') states the same claim about the left end of the right-most interval J izi in case the cost curve is in addition convex. Lemma 4.1(b) states the price of copies in the interval J i q+1 is higher than that of J i q , but not too far from it. Lemma 4.1(d) states that all price intervals except possibly the left-most and the right-most are fullsized. Armed with these facts, we first show that if "many" copies of item i are sold, then we are in good shape. The other case where "few" copies are sold, is dealt with subsequently.
The Case of Many Copies.:
Suppose we sell all copies in some interval J iq for q > 1: then we get that the profit made from that interval alone gives us a good approximation.
Lemma 4.2. If the number of sold copies
. We want to show we make a reasonable profit from the sales of copies in J iq . From Lemma 4.1(c), there are width i (π i (s)) many copies in J iq . For each of these copies k ∈ [r, s), the profit is
However, by
Step 7 of the pricing algorithm, for all k ∈ J iq , π i (k) = c i (s) + Δ, where Δ is determined by Step 6.
•
So, we make a profit of at least π i (s)/6 from each of the
Bi many copies in J iq :
where the last inequality is because t ≥ t/2 for t ≥ 1. Plugging in P f i = π i (s) completes the proof.
The Case of Few Copies:
Now suppose item i is such that the number of copies we sell either lies within the left-most interval J i1 , or only covers a small fraction of the second interval J i2 : the argument given above does not hold in that case. However we can show the following result.
Lemma 4.3. If the number of sold copies x i of item i is less than
Proof: Since we end up selling less than |J i1 | + |J i2 | copies, hence the final price P f i is at most 
where B i := 12 log(4n i / ) , and i := min{c inv i (Z), m}. Proof: For each item i, depending on the number of copies sold, either Lemma 4.2 or Lemma 4.3 applies, which implies that for each i ∈ I,
Applying Corollary A.1, we get
which completes the proof.
Convex cost curves
The analysis in this section holds only for convex cost curves. The crucial lemma which we will prove in this section is:
2 n }. which will suffice to prove the following result. Using Z ≤ U max ≤ W (opt), we get the desired result.
We now need to prove Lemma 4.5. The pricing algorithm terminates when it has priced all the copies, i.e. x is set to 1 and the if condition in Step 3 becomes false. x can be set to 1 either in Step 8 (preceded by x being set to 1 in Step 5) or in Step 11. We consider these two cases separately. − Algorithm terminates through Step 11: Lemma 4.8 proves that c 
Before proving Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.12, we state and prove the following lemma that characterizes the circumstances under which the algorithm terminates in either condition. = 0. Hence, right after creation of J i2 , when the algorithm checks for the if condition on point s in Step 4, it shall evaluate to false and therefore, the algorithm shall terminate through Step 11.
To prove the other direction, if the algorithm terminates through Step 11, then it must be the case that the if condition in Step 4 evaluated to false for some x. Further, x must be the left-end point of J i2 . This is because once the if condition evaluates to false, the algorithm jumps to Step 11 and creates a single price interval containing all copies that have not been priced yet and it includes the first copy and hence, this price interval must be J i1 . So x must be the left-end point of the price interval just after J i1 , i.e. J i2 . Now,
We now prove Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.12 that treat the two conditions under which the algorithm can terminate.
Algorithm terminates through
Step 11: The proof that price of J i2 is small follows almost immediately in this case. Algorithm terminates through Step 5: We will prove that price of the interval J i2 is 'small' by showing that relative to the price of right-most interval J izi , the prices for the subsequently created intervals on its left, have been slashed sufficiently often. For item i, label a copy x close if π i (x) < 3 c i (x), else label it as far. Depending on which of r and s are close or far, mark a price interval
Note that the rightmost interval J izi is not marked since it is semi-infinite. The following lemma indicates that in case prices are 'far' from the production cost, the algorithm slashes the prices exponentially. 
Lemma 4.9. If a contiguous sequence of price intervals
The interval J i1 can be marked either (F, C) or (F, F ), since c i (1) = 0 while π i (1) > 0 (Observation A.5). By Lemma 4.10, J i1 cannot be marked (F, C) . Hence, the only case left is when J i1 is marked (F, F ). Let q be the smallest value, if one exists, such that J iq is marked (F, C) . The smoothing algorithm can give purely multiplicative guarantees as long as the cost of the first O(log n) copies of the items is small compared to W (opt). As an example, suppose the cost functions are c i (k) = 0 for k ≤ d log n, and c i (k) = ∞ for k > dlog n for some constant d. Then i ≤ d log n, and B i = O(log n/ ). So for d large enough constant, B i · c(B i ) = 0, and we get an O(log n) approximation to the social welfare, as in [6] . (This is best possible for online algorithms [3] .)
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
In this section we show how to combine an online algorithm for social welfare maximization in the presence of increasing costs (such as those in previous sections) with an algorithm for a single-buyer profit maximization (such as the algorithm in [5] ) to yield an algorithm with strong profit guarantees for any sequence of buyers under increasing costs. This result builds on work of [4] for the case of single-minded buyers. Specifically, suppose we are given access to two algorithms:
• a deterministic social-welfare maximizing algorithm A, which given production cost curves {c i } i∈I , outputs pricing schemes {π i (·)} i∈I such that on any sequence σ of buyers, gives the guarantee
• and, a randomized single-buyer profit maximization algorithm B, which outputs a non-negative price vector τ for items i ∈ I and gives the guarantee that for any buyer b, with valuation v b (),
where S τ is the set of items bought by the buyer b when the price vector τ is presented and so i∈Sτ τ i is the resultant profit generated from buyer b. Note that max s⊆I v b (s) is an upper bound on maximum profit that can be generated from buyer b. Further algorithm B operates in a world with zero production costs, and may take as input a parameter T such that max S⊆I v b (S) < T ; the parameters μ, κ may be functions of T . 10 We further assume that for every item i ∈ I and k ∈ N, the price π i (k) set by algorithm A is at least as much as the production cost of that copy of the item. The main result of this section is 10 [5] give such a single-buyer profit maximization algorithm, a slight variant of which has κ = T /(2 m n) and μ = O(log(m n)). The algorithm picks a uniform price on a geometric scale for all items. It can be combined with either of the social welfare maximizing algorithms in this paper to give a O(log(m n))-profit maximizing algorithm+additive loss.
Theorem 5.1. Given a (ρ, β)-social welfare maximization algorithm A (satisfying Equation (6) ) and a (μ, κ)-single buyer profit maximization algorithm B (satisfying Equation (7)), we can construct a randomized profit-maximizing algorithm C whose expected profit over any sequence σ of buyers is at least (W (opt(σ)) − O(β + κ · |σ|)) /O(ρ+μ) .
Proof sketch: Algorithm C maintains a copy of algorithm A running in the background and keeps updating A's state with the sets buyers are buying. For each buyer j, with probability 1/2, algorithm C presents the price vector as specified by the current state of A and with probability 1/2, adds a random price vector, generated using B, to the price vector specified by A. The analysis, building on work of [4] , is deferred to the full version.
